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ESSAY
SECTION 12(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT:
DOES OLD LEGISLATION MATTER?
STEVEN THEL*
T HE "fundamental purpose" of the federal securities laws, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, is "'to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.' "I Privately initiated
litigation is the primary vehicle for assuring that what those selling
securities disclose is true.' The law under which security buyers re-
cover from those who make misrepresentations has been intensely
criticized since the Securities Act was enacted in 1933. The law has
changed greatly since then. Pressure for further change continues,
and private securities litigation is probably more controversial now
than ever.
This Term, the Supreme Court is faced with an extraordinarily diffi-
cult question about the liability of those who make misrepresentations
while selling securities. Gustafson v Alloyd Co. 3 presents the question
of whether section 12(2)1 of the Securities Act-which requires those
who make false statements while selling securities to refund their buy-
ers' money-applies in privately negotiated transactions. The Court's
strong inclination to discourage private securities litigation indicates a
narrow scope for section 12(2). At the same time, the clear language
of the statute indicates a broad scope. The conventional wisdom is
that this is an easy choice: the Court should follow the dictate of the
statute. However, the Court may well reject that answer, and perhaps
it should. A broad construction of section 12(2), in keeping with the
statutory language, will substantially change prevailing law, which it-
self is different from that originally created by the federal securities
statutes. At the same time, the strength of the legislative command
embedded in section 12(2) has weakened considerably since the stat-
ute was enacted. The Supreme Court ought not lightly abandon the
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994) (quoting
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (omitting internal
quotation marks)). The same language is used in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 477 (1977) (also quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963))); see also Schreiber v. Bul-
ington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1985) (quoting Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477).
2. Over 90% of the securities cases brought in federal courts are initiated by
private parties. See 1990 Director Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report
supp. tbl. S-8.
3. No. 92-2514, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 36891 (7th Cir. June 11, 1993), cert.
granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1994).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
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rule of law; but, when it decides the scope of section 12(2), it should
follow its own judgment of whether it is wise to limit the remedies
available in securities fraud litigation, even if that judgment conflicts
with the statute.
Reflexive obedience to the command of section 12(2) may be inap-
propriate, because, in the sixty years since the statute was enacted, the
federal law of private liability for misrepresentations in securities
transactions has become an ocean of common law, with only a few
inconsequential statutory islands. In this situation, Gustafson poses an
acute dilemma for the Court that simple models of statutory construc-
tion cannot easily solve.
I. THE DEBATE OVER THE SCOPE OF SECrION 12(2)
Disappointed securities investors who sue usually seek to recover
for violations of rule 10b-5.1 Courts have consistently held that pri-
vate parties can recover for violations of this rule, notwithstanding
that the rule and the statute under which it was adopted are silent on
the matter.6 Critics have worried over private rule 10b-5 litigation for
a long time, and the Supreme Court, in a string of cases over the past
twenty years, has limited the relief available to private plaintiffs for
violations of the rule.7
As the Supreme Court has made it more difficult for private parties
to prevail under rule 10b-5, unhappy investors have turned to section
12(2) of the Securities Act.8 Although section 12(2) is an integral part
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
6. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994)
(holding that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting action under
rule 10b-5); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782 (1991)
(holding that private rule lob-5 actions are governed by a relatively short one to three
year limitations period); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977)
(requiring proof of manipulation and deception to maintain an action under rule lOb-
5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring proof of "scien-
ter"-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud-to maintain a private action under
rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975) (limit-
ing the availability of private rule 10b-5 suits to purchasers and sellers of securities).
A few important decisions favor plaintiffs. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 231-34 (1988) (adopting "reasonable investor" standard for materiality element
and "fraud-on-the-market" theory for reliance element under rule 10b-5); Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387, 390 (1983) (holding that private plaintiff
may maintain a rule 10b-5 action even where a statutory express cause of action ap-
plies and rejecting Fifth Circuit's requirement of a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard in favor of a "preponderance of the evidence" standard); Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (stating that positive proof of reliance
is not a prerequisite to recovery under rule 10b-5); see also Musick, Peeler & Garrett
v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085,2086 (1993) (holding that defendants in a rule lob-5
action are entitled to seek contribution).
8. See Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 Harv. L. Rev.
908, 910 (1992) [hereinafter Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2)]; Patricia A. O'Hara,
Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The
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of the statutory remedial scheme, relatively few investors have pro-
ceeded under it until recently. As Professor Loss notes, section 12(2)
has long been one of the best kept secrets of the securities laws.9
Courts have resolved most section 12(2) interpretative questions
without much trouble," but one question has engendered sharp disa-
greement. That question is whether section 12(2) is available to all
security purchasers or only to those who buy in public offerings. This
question has divided the courts" and generated a substantial body of
academic commentary.' 2
Broadly speaking, section 12(2) requires anyone who "sells a secur-
ity... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which in-
cludes an untrue statement of a material fact" to refund the buyer's
money.'3 Buyers get their money back even if they did not rely on the
falsehood, so long as they did not know the truth at the time of
Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 921, 927-30 (1984); Therese H.
Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent
Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 847, 851 (1991) [herein-
after Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2)]; Robert A. Prentice, Section 12(2): A
Remedy for Wrongs in the Secondary Market?, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 97, 101-03 (1991):
Robert N. Rapp, The Proper Role of Securities Act Section 12(2) as an Aftermarket
Remedy for Disclosure Violations, 47 Bus. Law. 711, 712 (1992); Elliott J. Weiss, The
Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2) Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48
Bus. Law. 1, 4-6 (1992). Recent Supreme Court decisions limiting the defendants
who may be held liable for violations of rule 10b-5 and the period during which ac-
tions may be brought are likely to make section 12(2) relatively more attractive to
potential private plaintiffs. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455; Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at
2782.
9. Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 910; see also Maynard,
Liability Under Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 876 (noting that an express cause of
action for fraud in connection with secondary trading is available under section 12(2),
along with implied remedies under section 10(b)).
10. See Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 911-14 (discussing liti-
gation on control person liability, respondent superior, and the meaning of "seller").
11. Compare Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that section 12(2) does not apply to trading transactions) with Pacific
Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
section 12(2) does apply to trading transactions, as well as to initial offerings), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. CL 1146 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Harold S. Bloomenthal, Securities Law Handbook § 14.09(4) (1994);
J. William Hicks, Civil Liabilities: Enforcement and Litigation Under the 1933 Act,
17(A) Clark Boardman Callaghan Sec. L. Ser. § 6.01 (1994); Steven W. Hansen et al.,
Developments in Broker-Customer Litigation, 25 Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. 193,
197-99 (1992); Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 914-17; Louis Loss,
Securities Act Section 12(2): A Rebuttal, 48 Bus. Law. 47 (1992) [hereinafter Loss,
Securities Act Section 12(2): A Rebuttal]; Therese Maynard, The Future of Securities
Act Section 12(2), 45 Ala. L. Rev. 817 (1994) [hereinafter Maynard, The Future of
Section 12(2)]; Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 854-57; Pren-
tice, supra note 8, at 108-19; Rapp, supra note 8, at 714-18; Adam D. Hirsh, Com-
ment, Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act to the Aftermarket, 57 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 955, 957-61 (1990); Catherine Zucal, Comment, Does Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 Apply to Secondary Trading?: Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood
Walker, Inc., 65 St. John's L. Rev. 1179, 1179-83 (1991).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
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purchase. Moreover, they need not prove (or even allege) that the
seller acted culpably.14 Sellers can escape liability only by proving
that they did not know that their statements were false and could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable care.15 Thus, under section
12(2), a buyer can recover if she can prove that the seller made a
negligent misrepresentation in a prospectus or oral communication.16
The buyer does not even have to prove the seller's negligence.
Although the meaning of the word prospectus in section 12(2) is
hotly disputed, the statute itself defines "prospectus" to include essen-
tially every writing used to offer or sell a security. 7 If the statutory
definition controls, then section 12(2) is available in almost every case
in which a seller makes a false statement of a material fact while offer-
ing or selling a security, because almost any statement used to sell a
security is part of an oral communication or a written offer. For exam-
ple, a buyer would be able to recover merely by showing that the
seller made a false statement in a telephone call or document used in
connection with the sale.
Recently, defendants have argued, and courts generally have
agreed, that section 12(2) applies only to sales of securities in public
offerings.' 8 The courts' reasoning is essentially that the Securities Act
is addressed primarily to public distributions of securities and thus
that section 12(2) is available only to address misrepresentations made
in a public distribution. Under this interpretation, if a broker makes a
false statement while recommending the purchase of a security traded
14. See Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 912-13.
15. Only the seller is liable under section 12(2), however, so that the plaintiff can-
not look to the broad range of defendants available (until recently at least) under rule
10b-5. Cf. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994) (holding
that private plaintiff cannot maintain an aiding and abetting suit under rule 10b-5).
Others may be derivatively liable under section 12(2). See Loss, The Assault on Sec-
tion 12(2), supra note 8, at 912-14 (discussing statutory control-person liability and
respondeat superior). On the meaning of the term seller in section 12(2), see id. at
911; Maynard, The Future of Section 12(2), supra note 12, at 73; O'Hara, supra note 8;
cf. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641-54 (1988) (construing the term seller in case
brought under section 12(1)).
16. See Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 859-60. In addi-
tion, plaintiff buyer must prove that she did not know of the misrepresentation at the
time of purchase. See id. at 860-62. She need not prove, however, that she relied on
the misrepresentation. See id. at 860.
17. Section 2(10) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(10) (1988), says that the word "pro-
spectus" means any communication by writing, radio, or television that offers any
security for sale, and section 2(3), id. § 77(b)(3), defines the term "offer for sale" to
include every attempt to dispose of a security for value. Section 2(10) of the Act
excludes two forms of written offers from the definition of prospectus: tombstone
advertisements and so-called "free-writing," which is a written offer sent or given af-
ter the effective date of a registration statement that is accompanied or preceded by a
formal prospectus that meets the extensive requirements of section 10(a) of the Act.
Id. § 77j(a).
18. Cases restricting the application of section 12(2) to the public offering context
are discussed in Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2), supra 8, at 855-70 and May-
nard, The Future of Section 12(2), supra note 12, at 823-34.
1186 [Vol. 63
1995] SECTION 12(2)
in the secondary market,19 or if a seller makes such a statement in
connection with a privately negotiated trade," no public offering is
involved and section 12(2), therefore, is not available to the buyer.
Even if the above argument's premise-that the Securities Act is
addressed to public offerings-is correct, the argument runs into the
broad statutory definition of the phrase "prospectus" and the even
broader "oral communication." Professor Elliott Weiss offers an ex-
tensive response to this problem.21 He argues that the phrase "by
means of a prospectus or oral communication" in section 12(2) must
have been intended to limit the reach of the section, or it would have
been left out. To import the statutory definition of prospectus, how-
ever, extends the scope of section 12(2) to all transactions, as just
about every sale involves some written or oral offer.' To give the
prospectus clause some limiting effect, Professor Weiss insists, its
words must be read to encompass less than the expansive scope indi-
cated by the statutory definition of prospectus z3 Professor Weiss ar-
gues that the clause's meaning should be found in section 12(2)'s
statutory context, relevant legislative history and policy considera-
tions.2 4 He analyzes context, history and policy at length, and con-
cludes that they "strongly suggest that Congress intended section
12(2) to apply only when securities are sold in a public offering."'
Although Professor Weiss makes a nice argument, most commenta-
tors disagree with him. 6 They argue that the language, structure and
history of the Securities Act all point to a broad construction of sec-
tion 12(2) covering private transactions and secondary market trading
as well as public offerings.2 7 The point of this Essay is that the lan-
guage, structure and history of the Securities Act ought not to deter-
mine this debate-the Court is not bound by the statute-but perhaps
19. See, eg., Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that section 12(2) does not afford a remedy to buyers of securities in the
secondary market, even in the face of alleged oral misrepresentations made by
brokers).
20. See, e.g., Alloyd Co. v. Gustafson, No. 92-2514, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 36891
(7th Cir. June 11, 1993), cert. granted, 62 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1994).
21. See Prentice, supra note 8, at 124.
22. In fact, the definition of prospectus does exclude some written communica-
tions, and it is at least plausible that section 12(2) uses the word to assure coverage of
all communications but the excluded ones. See Steve Thel, Section 12(2) of the Secur-
ities Act Through the Lens of Free Writing (December 1994) (unpublished manu-
script on file with the author).
23. Weiss, supra note 8, at 6-8.
24. Id. at 7-8. The definitions section of the Securities Act provides that the defi-
nitions govern unless the context indicates otherwise, and Professor Weiss suggests
that this clause provides a statutory basis for reading the limiting phrase "in a public
offering" into section 12(2). Id. at 15-16.
25. Id. at 45.
26. See sources cited supra note 12. Prentice, supra note 8, takes essentially the
same position as Weiss.
27. I do not have a strong opinion on whether buyers in private and secondary-
market transactions should be allowed to recover under section 12(2).
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I should say that I think the language, structure and history of the
Securities Act indicate a broad application for section 12(2), covering
private transactions and secondary market trading, as well as public
offerings. In any event, in this Essay I have nothing to contribute to
the debate over the meaning of the statute except to note that when
section 12(2) was enacted it was widely understood to apply to trading
in outstanding securities and to privately negotiated transactions, as
well as to public offerings.2 8
28. See Arthur A. Ballantine, Amending the Federal Securities Act, 20 A.B.A. J.
85, 86 (1934) ("The liabilities provided for in the [Securities Act] in reference to deal-
ing in securities that are not newly issued are less serious than those as to new issues
.... "); Arthur H. Dean, The Federal Securities Act: I, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 50,102
("Section 12 imposes civil liability . . upon anyone selling any security including
outstanding securities ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact."); William 0. Douglas & George E.
Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act Upon Investment Banking, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev.
283, 297 (1933) ("It is obvious that the criminal penalties under § 17 and civil liabili-
ties imposed under § 12 have no relation to public offers. Those liabilities follow even
as respects a simple, isolated transaction in no sense public."); id. at 298 (noting that
the element of public offer is absent from definition of prospectus); John Hanna &
Edgar Thrlington, The Securities Act of 1933, 7 S. Cal. L. Rev. 18, 31 (1933) (stating
that section 12(2) applies to "any security, whether outstanding, registered or unregis-
tered"); see also George C. Thorpe & Challen B. Ellis, The Federal Securities Act
Manual § 123 (1933) (stating that "section 12(2), paragraph 2, of the Act applies to all
securities"); Baldwin B. Bane, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 14 B.U. L. Rev. 35,
41-42 (1934) (noting that section 12(2) gives a right of action to an immediate pur-
chaser of securities against any seller providing a prospectus containing a misrepre-
sentation or omission); Carl L. Bumiller, Exemptions of Securities and Transactions
Under the Federal Securities Act of 1933, 10 U. Cin. L. Rev. 125, 133 n.22, 156 n.67, 157
n.69 (1936) (interpreting language of section 12(2) to extend protection to all buyers
of securities, not just to those in public offerings); Douglas & Bates, supra, at 298-99;
Friedrich Kessler, The American Securities Act and Its Foreign Counterparts: A Com-
parative Study, 44 Yale LJ. 1133, 1134 (1935); Allen E. Throop & Chester T. Lane,
Some Problems of Exemption Under The Securities Act of 1933, 4 Law & Contemp,
Probs. 89, 90 (1937) ("Except as regards fraud or negligent misrepresentation on the
part of the seller.., the administrative provisions of the Act are primarily directed to
the problem of distribution, as distinguished from that of trading."); Legislation, 33
Colum. L. Rev. 1220, 1237 n.131 (1933) ("Although no person involved in a transac-
tion exempted from registration . . . need send a prospectus, all prospectuses sent
must be free from defects, or the liability imposed in § 12(2) applies.").
In 1941, the securities industry, with the concurrence of the SEC, recommended
that section 12(2) be amended, and the premise of these recommendations was that
section 12(2) applies to trading in outstanding securities. Cf Loss, Securities Act Sec-
tion 12(2): A Rebuttal, supra note 12, at 53 (discussing the 1941 amendment
proposal).
Professor Weiss seems to acknowledge that contemporary statements claiming that
section 12(2) applies to trading in outstanding securities are quite convincing evidence
of what Congress intended. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 38; see also Prentice, supra
note 8, at 137 (acknowledging that an SEC Commissioner stated that the application
of section 12(2) is broad).
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II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE SECTION 12(2) DEBATE-
PRIVATE RECOVERY FOR VIOLATIONS OF RULE 1OB-5
The debate over section 12(2) would not have arisen if the Supreme
Court had not made it so difficult for plaintiffs to recover for viola-
tions of rule 10b-5.29 So long as it was relatively easy for a private
party to recover under rule 10b-5, section 12(2) did not matter. Sec-
tion 12(2) became important only after the courts held that buyers
cannot recover for violations of rule 10b-5 unless they prove scienter
and reliance.
Notwithstanding the vast number of private actions brought for vio-
lations of rule 10b-5, neither section 10(b) of the Exchange Act nor
rule 10b-5 itself provides a private right of action for violations of the
rule. Instead, courts created the private right of action and defined its
parameters. Courts allowed private parties to recover for violations of
rule 10b-5 almost as soon as the rule was adopted? ° When the
Supreme Court finally addressed the question in 1971, the unanimous
Court disposed of the issue with a blunt, but accurate, single sentence
in a footnote: "It is now established that a private right of action is
implied under § 10(b).'
The Supreme Court did not decide its first rule 10b-5 case until a
large body of law had already developed in hundreds of lower court
decisions. A tremendous body of case law from the lower courts still
governs innumerable questions. However, in more than a dozen
cases, the Supreme Court itself has established most of the basic doc-
trines that govern private actions for violations of rule 10b-5. One set
of Supreme Court cases has outlined the conduct forbidden by the
rule. In these cases, the Court has implicitly assumed that rule 10b-5
forbids everything that the SEC can forbid and has focused on the
question of what conduct is within the scope of the Commission's sec-
tion 10(b) power.32 These cases established the core requirements of
29. See Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 909 ("The story started
fifteen years ago with Ernst & Ernst v. Hodifelder....").
30. An implied right of action under rule 10b-5 was first recognized in 1946 in
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The history
of the judicial development of the rule 10b-5 private action has been told many times.
See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-81 n.10 (1983) (trac-
ing the development of case law on the issue of a private right of action under rule
10b-5).
31. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975)
(recognizing existence of private action for violations of rule 10b-5); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972) (same).
32. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Fed-
eral Securities Law: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 977 (1994);
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 463 (1990).
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deception33 and scienter.3 4 Early on, the Court indicated that decep-
tion can run afoul of the rule if it has even a slight connection with a
securities transaction.3 1 In its most recent rule 10b-5 case, the Court
held that those who aid and abet violations of the rule cannot be held
liable in a private action, and it suggested that the SEC may not pur-
sue them either. 6
Most of the Court's rule 10b-5 cases are more narrowly directed.
Rather than deciding what conduct is (or could be made) unlawful,
they have addressed the relief available to private parties once a rule
10b-5 violation is established. The Court has created rules governing
standing,37 arbitrability,3 8 affirmative defenses,3 9 contribution,4 ° the
period during which actions must be commenced, 41 the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof4 2 and various aspects of causation.43
Now that all of this has been said and done, there is a substantial
body of law on private actions for violations of rule 10b-5. There are
probably more than a thousand reported opinions.44 Several multi-
volume treatises and a substantial part of the securities-law encyclope-
dias are devoted to the rule,45 as are uncounted law review articles. 46
Law teachers consider the Supreme Court's rule 10b-5 cases to be so
33. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977); see also Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655-59 (1983) (holding that the duty to disclose information arises
from the relationship between the parties and not merely from one's ability to acquire
information because of one's position in the market); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that the duty to disclose under rule 10b-5 does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic information).
34. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976); see also Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687-702 (1980) (determining that scienter is an element of a rule
10b-5 violation).
35. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971); SEC
v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466-69 (1969).
36. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994).
37. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747 (1975).
38. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-38
(1987).
39. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 318-19
(1985).
40. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1993).
41. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,2780-82 (1991).
42. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380-82 (1983).
43. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (materiality and reliance); Af-
filiated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972) (reliance).
44. See Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 911.
45. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 9 (1988);
Alan Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud
(1990); 2 Thomas Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation 51-219 (1990 &
Supp. 1993); Arnold S. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5 (1980); 7, 8 Louis Loss &
Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 3485-3729 (3d ed. 1991).
46. See Michael J. Kaufman, A Little "Right" Musick. The Unconstitutional Judi-
cial Creation of Private Rights of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 287, 287 n.2 (1994) ("More scholarship has been
devoted to the private right of action for violations of section 10(b) than to any other
securities law issue.").
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fundamental that they are reproduced in the basic corporations
casebooks and discussed at length in many introductory corporations
courses. Perhaps because of this, most lawyers and judges (and proba-
bly legislators) know far more about rule 10b-5 than they do about
any of the statutory provisions addressed to misrepresentation-in-
cluding section 12(2).' 7
III. Ti RELEVANCE OF RULE 1OB-5 TO THE MEANING OF
SECTION 12(2)
Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has made it difficult
for securities buyers to recover on the basis of misrepresentations
made in the sale of securities. If the Court decides that section 12(2)
applies to all securities transactions, it will effectively overturn much
of this law. A broad construction of section 12(2) will allow people
who buy securities in privately negotiated transactions or on the ad-
vice of their brokers to rescind those transactions if they can prove
that the seller made an untrue statement of material fact. These buy-
ers are not entitled to any relief under rule 10b-5 unless they also can
prove that they relied on the misrepresentationsa1 and that the sellers
acted with scienter.49
It seems inconceivable that when the Court decides Gustafson it
will ignore the possible implications of its decision for the restrictive
rules it has developed in its rule 10b-5 cases, but the academic com-
mentators on the question would have them do so. While everybody
who has weighed in on the debate over section 12(2) recognizes that
the real issue is whether to allow recovery to buyers who cannot prove
scienter or reliance, they also seem to think that the courts should
decide the scope of section 12(2) without considering whether such
plaintiffs should recover."0 Even Professor Weiss agrees that the
Court should not consider its history with rule 10b-5 in deciding
whether section 12(2) applies to after-market trading and negotiated
transactions.51
47. Cf Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. CL 1439, 1445 (1994) (calling
10b-5 "the most familiar private cause of action").
48. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,250 (1988); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972). In these cases, the Court recognized a
presumption of reliance when the false statement is disseminated into the market
(Basic) or consists of a nondisclosure (Affiliated Ute). These presumptions substan-
tially reduce the problem of proving reliance in many cases but would not assist the
typical plaintiffs who desire a broad construction of section 12(2). Section 12(2) plain-
tiffs complain of misrepresentations in privately negotiated or broker-recommended
transactions in which there are no presumptions of reliance.
49. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8, at 916 (commenting
that "to argue that the application of section 12(2) to ordinary trading would impinge
on the rule's scienter requirement is to stand the art of statutory interpretation on its
head").
51. See Weiss, supra note 8, at 35-36.
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The objection to the Court's construing section 12(2) narrowly to
preserve rule 10b-5 precedent is that to do so would usurp Congress'
law-making power.-2 The regime of private liability for violations of
rule 10b-5 is judge-made law, and conventional notions of federal judi-
cial power suggest that such law cannot serve as a basis for ignoring
the statute. This is a powerful objection, and perhaps the Court
should just apply section 12(2) literally, regardless of rule 10b-5.
Nonetheless, the Court is likely to consider the 10b-5 issue, although it
may not acknowledge doing so. 5 3 Despite the problem of apparent
overreaching, if the Court believes that denying some classes of buy-
ers the remedy of section 12(2) will improve the law, then the Court
should consider doing so even though section 12(2) indicates that it is
available to all buyers.
If the Supreme Court holds that section 12(2) applies to all securi-
ties transactions, it will profoundly change what has been the law for
twenty years: that buyers of securities cannot recover in federal court
for negligent misrepresentations and that they cannot recover on the
basis of a face-to-face misrepresentation that they have not relied
upon. That body of law, fashioned by courts under rule 10b-5, may be
illegitimate, but it is real and substantial. If the Court substantially
changes the law of private liability on the basis of its understanding of
what Congress intended in enacting the Securities Act in 1933, this
change will be made without anyone deciding that it is a change for
the better.
Congress may have decided in 1933 that recovery should be allowed
to all buyers under section 12(2) without proof of scienter or reli-
ance-I think it did. However, Congress has not decided to change
the substantial body of private-liability law that the courts have devel-
oped since then. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the putative leg-
islative base for rule 10b-5 liability, was not the law when section 12(2)
was enacted. Even when section 10(b) was enacted in 1934, no one
expected it to serve as a basis for private liability, let alone for a
scheme of liability that would supplant most of what the statutes did.5
52. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy
in Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 594 ("Our legal culture's under-
standing of the link between statutory interpretation and democratic theory verges on
the canonical and is embodied in the principle of 'legislative supremacy.'" (citation
omitted)).
53. Cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 Geo.
L.J. 353, 358 (1989) (criticizing theories that call for judges abandoning legislative
intent and adopting candor in its place).
54. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2780 (1991) (stat-
ing that "we have made no pretense that it was Congress' design to provide the rem-
edy afforded" to private parties for violations of rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) ("IT]here is no indication that Congress, or the
Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated a private right of action for
violations of the rule."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730,
737 (1975) ("[Tlhe plaintiff class for purposes of a private damage action under
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If the courts are going to change the law by making section 12(2) re-
covery available to buyers who have been denied recovery under rule
10b-5, then the Supreme Court should decide whether this change is
wise before it settles the question.
Conventional conceptions of the proper role of the courts in apply-
ing legislation are especially strained when it comes to applying sec-
tion 12(2), because the courts radically changed the federal law of
private recovery for securities fraud when they created the private
remedy for violations of rule 10b-5. It is simply too late to say that
law-making in this area is for Congress alone and not for the courts.
The courts made law when they created the private right of action for
violations of rule 10b-5, and they have been making it ever since. The
private right of action for violations of rule 10b-5 is firmly established
and is now more central to the regime of federal securities regulation
than section 12(2) ever was. The courts are not going to abandon the
private remedy for violations of rule 10b-5.
Given this history, when the Supreme Court decides the scope of
section 12(2), it should not just focus on what Congress and the Presi-
dent intended in 1933. It should focus also on the implications of sec-
tion 12(2) for the private-liability regime it has adopted under rule
10b-5. The Court should give section 12(2) the scope that it believes
best serves a wise and coherent scheme of private liability.
This Essay does not undertake to develop a unifying theory of stat-
utory construction or separation of powers that defines the Court's
authority to ignore the mandate of legislation. However, there are
two possible justifications for the Court's assumption of a law-making
role in this area: the need for coherent and stable law, especially in
light of changing circumstances, and the notion of delegated law-mak-
ing power.
1. Coherent and Stable Law
It seems clear that the Supreme Court would not abandon the pri-
vate right of action for violations of rule 10b-5 even if it concluded
that the private action should not have been implied in the first
place.55 I am as convinced as anyone that most of the Court's rule
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securities.");
Grundfest, supra note 32, at 986; Loss, The Assault on Section 12(2), supra note 8. at
915-16; David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of the
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 627, 635 (1963); Thel, supra note 22, at 432
n.209; see also Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employer's Trust Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085,2088
(1993) ("The private right of action under Rule 10b-5 was implied by the judiciary.").
Justice Stevens has suggested that the implication of a private right of action for
violations of rule 10b-5 on a tort theory was in keeping with the intent of Congress.
See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1456 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2783-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See supra note 54 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court has suggested
that Congress did not intend to create a private remedy for violations of rule 10b-5).
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10b-5 jurisprudence is wrong, but I do not think that the Court should
reverse itself now. Even Supreme Court justices who are quite hostile
to the judicial creation of private actions for the violation of statutes
and who are begrudging of an expansive construction of rule 10b-5
seem to regard the private action for violations of rule 10b-5 as too
well established to be overturned.5 6
The cases that created the private right of action under rule 10b-5
counsel a narrow construction of section 12(2). Of course, none of
these cases states that a section 12(2) action is not available to people
who buy in the securities markets or in privately negotiated transac-
tions. However, an expansive construction of section 12(2) would un-
dermine the Supreme Court's restrictive treatment of private
remedies for securities fraud. Courts ensure legal stability and coher-
ence by following their own precedent.57 For the same reasons, the
Court should follow its rule 10b-5 cases when it decides the scope of
section 12(2).
A problem with this argument is that section 12(2) clearly states
that it is available to buyers in all transactions. In its rule 10b-5 cases,
the Court has consistently said that it is simply doing what Congress
wanted when it enacted the statutes. It stretches the functions of stare
decisis to argue that the Court's construction of one part of the securi-
ties laws binds it to ignore the will of Congress clearly articulated in
another part.
However, it is not entirely correct to say that the Supreme Court
has been construing section 10(b) of the Exchange Act in its rule 10b-
5 cases. In an important sense, the Court has been construing-or
even making-the whole scheme of private liability for misrepresenta-
tions in securities trading. For most of the time that the Court has
been deciding rule 10b-5 cases, rule 10b-5 occupied the whole field of
private liability for misrepresentations in the sale of securities, except
for the few cases involving misrepresentations in effective registration
56. Justice Scalia is particularly hostile to the implication of private actions. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that courts should "get out of the business of implied private rights of action alto-
gether"); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2783(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that it is "too lawless to be imagined" for a court to
assert that it can create an appropriate statute of limitations because it has created the
cause of action in the first place). Scalia, however, joined the Court's opinion in Mu-
sick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., which granted 10b-5 defendants a right to
seek contribution, reasoning that in enacting recent statutes, Congress had acknowl-
edged the rule 10b-5 private action. 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2089 (1993). Justice Thomas
dissented in Musick, but wrote that "[w]e again have no cause to reconsider whether
the 10b-5 action should have been recognized at all." Id. at 2092 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
57. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1989).
58. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976) and Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 687-702 (1980), the Court indicated that its conclusion that negligent
misrepresentations are not actionable under rule 10b-5 was consistent with, and per-
haps dictated by, the scheme of federal regulation as a whole.
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statements, for which the remedy of section 11 of the Securities Act
was also available5 9 The Court has self-consciously acted as though it
has been responsible for making the rules for the whole universe of
private securities litigation, and in fact it has been. In most of its rule
10b-5 cases, the Court was deciding whether a private remedy was
available, not just whether one was available under rule 10b-5.
In 1983, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the implica-
tions of the overlap between rule 10b-5 and statutorily expressed pri-
vate remedies, when it decided Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston.6°
In that case, the Court held that the rule 10b-5 action is available to
redress false statements in a registration statement, notwithstanding
that section 11 of the Securities Act provides a private remedy for
false registration statements. Huddleston expanded the set of reme-
dies available to security buyers by giving them a remedy that Con-
gress had declined to provide. If the Court gives section 12(2) a
narrow scope on the basis of its rule 10b-5 cases, it will simply be
giving sellers a set of defenses that Congress declined to give in 1933.
The effect of Huddleston was that the judicially created private rem-
edy for violations of rule 10b-5 survives inconsistent statutory law.61
If section 12(2) is made available to buyers in the market or in negoti-
ated transactions, the restrictive doctrines that the Court has devel-
oped in its rule 10b-5 decisions will no longer matter in many cases.
Section 12(2) will provide an alternative remedy for a substantial
number of buyers whose complaints have traditionally been denied
under rule 10b-5, and it will allow those buyers to recover in circum-
stances in which the Court has decided recovery is inappropriate. A
broad construction of section 12(2) that destroys the constraints that
the Court has developed for private litigation under rule 10b-5 would
be inconsistent with the decisions that created those constraints. Re-
spect for those decisions requires a narrow construction of section
12(2). In any event, if the Court ignores the language of section 12(2)
and gives it a restrictive reading, it may actually move Congress finally
to revisit the whole issue of private liability. Ironically, overt judicial
law making may be just what is needed to ensure that securities law is
legislative.62
Whether the Court has been construing the whole of the federal
securities laws or only section 10(b) of the Exchange Act in its rule
10b-5 cases, the fact that the rule 10b-5 cases address in detail the
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
60. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
61. See Mary Siegel, The Interplay Benveen the Implied Remedy Under Section
10(b) and the Express Causes of Action of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 B.U. L Rev.
385, 392 (1982) (discussing inconsistencies between section 11 and rule 10b-5).
62. Cf Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 186 (1989) (condemning the
notion that legislative silence in response to judicial decisions constitutes
acquiescence).
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same subject as section 12(2) may justify ignoring the expressed will of
Congress, if that is what it takes to square section 12(2) with the rule
10b-5 cases. The Court would no more be making law if it ignored the
language of section 12(2) than it was when it recognized and devel-
oped the private right of action for rule 10b-5; a substantial part of the
law of private remedies has been made by the courts, not by Congress.
Having taken responsibility for making the law, the Court is not
obliged to pull up short now. The point is not that having ignored
Congress when they created the private right of action for rule 10b-5
violations, the courts can continue to ignore Congress now. Rather,
the point is that having ignored Congress then, the courts are no
longer able to do what Congress commanded.
Much of the substantial body of law that has developed around rule
10b-5 addresses the same subject as does section 12(2). This redun-
dancy complicates the interpretation and application of section 12(2).
Even if stare decisis does not justify using the rule 10b-5 cases to re-
write section 12(2), section 12(2) now works in an environment that
greatly differs from that prevailing in 1933. The question of the scope
of section 12(2) is complicated by events that have occurred in the
sixty years since the Securities Act was enacted; Gustafson would have
been a much simpler case in 1935 than it is in 1995. These changed
circumstances ought to be reflected in current construction.
Regardless of whether the law that the courts have developed under
rule 10b-5 is good, if the Supreme Court endorses a broad, literal ap-
plication of section 12(2) now, it will destroy a great deal of judicial
product and unsettle the real expectations of participants in the secur-
ities markets that have presumably shaped business practices. Literal
application of section 12(2) also will create discontinuities in the law
governing recovery against those accountable under section 12(2) and
those accountable only under rule 10b-5. Sellers who make false
statements will face liability for disgorgement under section 12(2)
even if they have not acted with scienter or caused any harm to their
buyers. On the other hand, buyers and non-trading issuers that make
false statements will face liability only under rule 10b-5, so that they
will be liable only if they act with scienter and then only for the dam-
ages their false statements cause. These discontinuities may be appro-
priate, but they were not created by Congress. The Supreme Court
should not sanction them unless it first decides that it is a good idea to
do so.
As the Court decides Gustafson, it should consider post-enactment
developments. Even a good agent trying to do exactly what Congress
wanted could hardly be sure that Congress would want slavish devo-
tion to the words of section 12(2), and, in this situation, the advan-
tages said to flow from applying a statute as directed by its text would
be bought at a substantial cost.
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There is much to be said for considering post-enactment develop-
ments in applying statutes, and commentators have said much of it.63
Two of the most prominent commentators who have suggested that
sometimes courts ought to update or reinterpret statutes in the light of
changed circumstances conclude that updating is inappropriate when
the statute is clear on its face.' This caveat comes to bear on the
question of the scope of section 12(2), for the language of section
12(2) is unambiguous. Of course, ambiguity can be found in any stat-
utory language, although if section 12(2) is ambiguous, the ambiguity
requirement for judicial updating is of little consequence. In any
event, it is not clear why courts can update statutes as a general matter
but not if they are unambiguous. Perhaps those who would condition
the judicial power to update statutes on ambiguity worry that judicial
updating that contravenes the clear, unambiguous language of a stat-
ute would highlight the conflict between a regime of judicial amend-
ment and conventional norms of legislative supremacy.65 Yet
whatever justifies a court's considering post-enactment developments
in applying a statute is at work however clear the statute is. Section
12(2) presents a particularly compelling case for judicial updating,
notwithstanding its admirably clear language.
2. Delegated Law-making Power
If the Supreme Court says that it is ignoring section 12(2) to keep
the law coherent or because the statute was made for a different time,
Gustafson will have implications outside securities law. The peculiar
development of the law of private liability for securities fraud may
63. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 31-43
(1982) (discussing the modem judicial role in the face of the increasing "statutorifica-
tion" of American Law); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,
87 Mich. L. Rev. 20 (1988) (examining archeological statutory interpretation in two
forms-textualism and intentionalism); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60
Tex. L. Rev. 527, 531 (1982) (noting that propositions of law are more than simply
straightforward descriptions of legal history;, they also combine elements of descrip-
tion and evaluation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987) (observing that it is odd that many judges consider only the
text and historical context when interpreting statutes, because judges consider the
subsequent interpretational history of constitutional and common law issues); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 422-
24, 493-97 (1989) (recognizing that many disputes over statutory meaning are in fact
disagreements over appropriate background norms); see also Schacter, supra note 52,
at 631-36 (commenting on theories that support judicial interpretation based on cur-
rent values and pragmatism, rather than on historical notions).
64. Eskridge, supra note 63, at 1496-97, 1542-44; Sunstein, supra note 63, at 493-
97; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 63 (suggesting that statutes should be read as
though they were enacted yesterday).
65. See Sunstein, supra note 63, at 494 n.371; see also Martin H. Redish & Theo-
dore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death
of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 803, 831-37 (1994) (criticiz-
ing dynamic interpretation as a usurpation of legislative authority); Zeppos, supra
note 53, at 385-89.
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justify the Court's ignoring the statute, but courts do not often claim
the power to ignore statutes even in unusual situations. Recent legis-
lation on private securities litigation, however, can fairly be read to
delegate broad law-making power to the courts. That delegation may
serve as a basis on which the Court can lawfully ignore the clear im-
port of section 12(2).
As the courts developed the law of private liability for misrepresen-
tations in the sale of securities, Congress generally deferred. How-
ever, Congress occasionally made adjustments expressed in oblique
statutes. 66 A substantial body of legislation dealing with particular as-
pects of the private right of action for securities fraud has been en-
acted in the last ten years. This legislation has codified certain
judicially developed doctrines and secured certain aspects of the pri-
vate right of action for violations of rule 10b-5. Nonetheless, Congress
has refrained from defining the law's parameters. Instead, it has left
the formulation of the private liability regime to the courts.
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 ["Sanctions Act"], 67 the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act ["Enforcement
Act"] 68 of 1988 and the statute of limitations for previously initiated
rule 10b-5 actions recently added to the Exchange Act all seem to
ratify and codify the courts' power to make the law of private liability
for rule 10b-5 violations. The Sanctions Act, the Enforcement Act
and the limitations provision are all premised not merely on the exist-
ence of a private remedy for violations of rule 10b-5 but also on the
proposition that courts appropriately make the law governing private
liability.
Among other things, the Sanctions Act makes it unlawful to trade
options while in possession of material, non-public information ema-
nating from the issuer of the underlying stock. It also allows public
options traders to recover from insiders who unlawfully trade options.
Neither reform was accomplished by direct or complete statutory
command. Instead, the statute provides that options trading is unlaw-
ful when trading the underlying stock is unlawful and says that public
options traders have a right to recover against insider option traders
"comparable" to the right of public stock traders against insiders who
unlawfully trade stock.69 The Sanctions Act does not say when trad-
ing stock is unlawful or when public stock traders can recover. In-
stead, the Sanctions Act's options-rules build entirely on the judicially
66. See Steve Thel, Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act: Congress, the
Supreme Court, the SEC and the Process of Defining Insider Trading, 69 N.C. L. Rev.
1261, 1269 (1991).
67. Pub. L. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
68. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
69. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(d) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(d) (1988)).
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created rules on insider stock trading, and the Sanctions Act does not
even restate those rules. Moreover, so far as the Sanctions Act goes,
if the courts change the law of insider stock trading in the future, that
change will also govern insider option trading.7" This technique of in-
corporating judge-made law into the statute brings forward to the op-
tions area all the questions about what stock trading is illegal and
actionable and adds its own complications about how the statute
changes things.7 ' Nonetheless, Congress decided to piggyback on
judge-made law rather than saying what it wanted on its own.
Four years later, Congress again built upon and incorporated judge-
made law in the Enforcement Act, which gives contemporaneous
traders a right of action against those who trade securities in violation
of rule 10b-5 while in possession of material, non-public information. 1
Once again, the statute does not say when trading violates the rule;
that question must be answered by reference to case law. Congress'
failure to set out just what is unlawful is particularly telling here, for
Congress was under intense pressure to do so.73 Nonetheless, Con-
gress chose to leave the development of the law to the courts.
The most recent legislation dealing with private rule 10b-5 actions is
the 1991 amendment to the Exchange Act that purported to restore
the old statute of limitations for private actions initiated before the
Supreme Court decided Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson.74 That legislation established a limitations period for "any
private civil action implied under [section 10(b)] that was com-
menced" before the Supreme Court decided Lampf, and directed fed-
eral courts to reinstate such actions that had been dismissed by
retroactive application of Lampf.75 Despite considerable support for
legislation that would have provided an explicit limitations period for
private rule 10b-5 actions, Congress left Lampf as the law for future
cases and simply attempted to limit the decision's retroactive effect 7 6
Even in that limited field, the statute did not state a limitations period
70. Similarly, the treble damages provisions of the ITSA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(2)
(1988), are triggered by illegal trading or tipping. The question of legality is deter-
mined by reference to case law.
71. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its
Effect on Existing Law, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1273, 1290-91 (1984); Villiam K.S. Wang, A
Cause of Action for Option Traders Against Insider Option Traders, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1056, 1057 (1988).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988).
73. See Grundfest, supra note 32, at 996-97; see also Donald Langevoort, Insider
Trading: Regulation, Enforcement & Prevention 2-21 to 2-23, 13-1 to 13-3 (1994)
(discussing Congressional action and inaction in the area of insider trading law in the
1980s).
74. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
75. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 27A (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa-1 (Supp. IV 1991)).
76. See Grundfest, supra note 32, at 997; Kaufman, supra note 46, at 333; Craig W.
Palm, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Excange Act. Is Congress
Rubbing Lampf the Wrong Way?, 37 Vll. L. Rev. 1213, 1261-63 (1992).
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for actions pending when Lampf was decided. It instead provided
that those actions were to be governed by the "limitation period pro-
vided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of
retroactivity," the day before Lampf was decided. 77 Once again, Con-
gress decided that these cases should be governed by judge-made law,
even though the process of determining that law was likely to be pre-
posterously complicated.78
In the Sanctions Act, the Enforcement Act and the limitations legis-
lation, Congress has acknowledged that the courts make the law of
private liability for securities fraud and established a regime that con-
templates the courts' continuing to do so. This delegation of law-mak-
ing power has not been lost on the courts themselves. In 1993, when
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of contribution among rule
10b-5 violators in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance, it
made its by-then standard disclaimer that because the courts created
the private remedy for violations of rule 10b-5, they cannot now re-
fuse to make law on the theory that only Congress can make law.7 9
The Court went on, however, to suggest that the courts now have stat-
utory authority to regulate private remedies for misrepresentations in
the sale of securities. The Court observed that in the Enforcement
Act and the post-Lampf limitations statute, Congress took account of
the Court's cumulative work in designing the private action, and the
Court cited those statutes as evidence that Congress recognized "a
judicial authority to shape, within limits, the 10b-5 cause of action.""0
"Indeed, the [limitations statute] not only treats the 10b-5 action as an
accepted feature of our securities laws, but avoids entangling Con-
gress in its formulation. That task, it would appear, Congress has left
to us."81
If a legislature wants to authorize the courts to repeal a statute,
maybe it ought to say so quite clearly. Congress has not in so many
words said that the courts can repeal section 12(2). The three legisla-
tive initiatives discussed above address problems with the private rem-
edy for violations of rule 10b-5 and respond to law developed by
courts in that context. However, in those statutes Congress has
counted on the courts to make the law of private liability for securities
fraud, and Congress has spoken in enacted statutes, not through silent
acquiescence. More than ratifying what the courts have done, these
statutes gave the courts power to make the law of private liability for
securities fraud. Indeed, each left the courts responsible for making
the law even in the area it specifically addressed. In none did Con-
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
78. See Jill E. Fisch, As Time Goes By: New Questions About the Statute of Limi-
tations for Rule 10b-5, 61 Fordham L. Rev. Sl01, S115-16 (1993).
79. See 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088-89 (1993).
80. Id. at 2089 (citation omitted).
81. Id. (citation omitted).
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gress itself say what was illegal (or privately actionable) except by ref-
erence to existing law, which was almost entirely judge made.
Whatever Congress did when it first enacted the securities statutes
sixty years ago, it has since indicated that now the courts are to formu-
late the rules of private liability for securities fraud. In this situation,
the Supreme Court will not overreach if it amends section 12(2).
CONCLUSION
It is likely that when the Supreme Court decides the scope of sec-
tion 12(2), it will be guided by its history with rule 10b-5 and its sense
of the policies that should define the law of private liability. The con-
ventional vision of federal law-making, in which the courts play at
most a supplemental role of filling gaps in legislation, indicates that
the Court ought not to consider policy, but should concern itself only
with what Congress did when it enacted the Securities Act. It will be
unfortunate, however, if the Court ignores the merits of the law it will
make when it decides Gustafson.
If section 12(2) of the Securities Act is now applied according to its
terms, the law of private liability for misrepresentation in the sale of
securities will change radically. Moreover, the regimes governing mis-
representation in securities transactions will differ substantially de-
pending on who makes the misrepresentation and in what context the
misrepresentation is made. This change, and the discontinuities it will
introduce, may be for the best, but the Supreme Court should not
make the change without considering whether it is wise to do so.
The Court can decide that the problems of a broad construction of
section 12(2) justify giving the provision a narrow scope without
claiming broad power to ignore a statute that it feels is unwise. The
dispute over section 12(2) presents a special case because it requires
interpreting the statute against the background of the judicially cre-
ated law of private liability for rule 10b-5 violations. Once the courts
established the private remedy for violations of rule 10b-5 and its pa-
rameters, it was impossible to return to the law established by Con-
gress. The Court cannot do so now, no matter how it construes
section 12(2).
In a sense, the Court's problem in Gustafson is to decide whether to
follow the clear direction of the Congress that enacted section 12(2) in
1933 or to follow the apparent desire of more recent Congresses that
courts shape private liability law as it sees best. Neither approach will
yield a private liability regime firmly grounded in the statutes, but the
latter is more likely to yield one that makes sense.
Recently, courts have been preoccupied with legislation and statu-
tory interpretation, and many scholars have devoted themselves to the
exploration of that subject. Much of their attention has been directed
to the problem of applying ambiguous statutory language to a factual
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circumstance the statute does not address clearly. The application of
section 12(2) presents a tougher question, however, because the lan-
guage of the statute is quite clear. Fortunately, other aspects of con-
temporary doctrine and scholarship on legislation do bear on the
problems posed by section 12(2). This Essay has only sketched the
problem and possible solutions. The controversy over section 12(2)
presents this problem rather starkly, but principled arguments can be
made for considering the law of rule 10b-5 when deciding how to ap-
ply section 12(2).
